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Abstract
THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS THE CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS of the health care sys-
tem in the United States. The 1990s were a decade of reform and change in US
medical care, with the debate over the Clinton plan for universal insurance and, af-
ter its defeat, the spread of managed care. In particular, managed care had a pro-
found impact on the delivery of medical services, transforming traditional insur-
ance arrangements. However, after all of the changes, the United States appears to
be no closer to solving the problems that have characterized its health care system
for the past 3 decades. Over 40 million Americans lack health insurance, universal
coverage is nowhere in sight, and medical care costs are rising again after a period
of moderation. It is doubtful that incremental health reforms will significantly ame-
liorate these problems.
The health care system in the United States remains a “paradox of excessand deprivation.”1 The United States spends more on medical servicesthan any other nation, and US physicians earn more than their counter-
parts in Canada, Europe and Japan. Americans with insurance have access to the
latest in sophisticated medical technology and innovative medical procedures; rates
of diffusion for many medical technologies, such as magnetic resonance imaging,
are generally higher in the United States than in other industrialized democracies.2
Indeed, the availability of these resources is so widespread that some analysts be-
lieve that well-insured Americans are receiving too many medical services. At the
same time, millions of Americans receive too little medical care.3 Over 40 million
Americans do not have health insurance,4 which makes the United States the only
democratic country in the world with a substantial uninsured population.
The 1990s was a decade of reform and change in US health care. After the 1994
failure of then President Bill Clinton’s effort to enact a government-sponsored sys-
tem of universal health care insurance, the private market emerged as the engine of
health reform. US medicine moved toward “managed care” arrangements, with ris-
ing enrolment in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and the growth of for-
profit health plans. Market-based health reform was viewed by proponents as a so-
lution to health care cost inflation and an opportunity to enhance both quality of
care and patient choice. However, by the end of the decade a widespread backlash
against managed care had developed.
What is the state of the US health care system after a decade of turbulence?
What has been the impact of managed care? And what is the outlook for health
care reform? This article reviews the current status and future prospects of the US
health care system. In particular, I focus on the persistent problem of the unin-
sured, efforts at cost control and the role of managed care.
Little progress for the uninsured
The US health care system is often erroneously labelled a private health care
system. In fact, the United States has a mixed system of public and private insur-
ance, though the word “system” connotes much more organization and logic than
is actually at work. Most working-age Americans receive health insurance through
their employers. Medicare, a federal government program similar in structure to
Canada’s single-payer medicare insurance, provides health insurance to all Ameri-
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cans over 65 years of age as well as to persons with disabili-
ties or end-stage renal disease. Medicaid, a jointly funded
federal–state program, covers low-income Americans (it
reaches about 40% of the poor), including seniors who
“spend down” their incomes and assets to a level that quali-
fies them for Medicaid–funded nursing-home care. In be-
tween those covered by this hodgepodge of private and
public plans, however, lies a substantial population without
any health insurance at all (Table 1).5
In 2000, 14% of Americans lacked health insurance.5
About 80% of the uninsured are either workers or live in
families with workers. They typically have low-wage jobs
or work in small businesses in which the employer does not
offer health insurance or, if it is offered, they cannot afford
to purchase it.6 The uninsured are disproportionately of
low income. In 2000, one-third of the poor were unin-
sured, and two-thirds of uninsured adults had incomes less
than 200% of the federal poverty line, or US$26 580
(Can$39 498) for a family of 3.6 Substantially more black
(18.5%) and Hispanic (32%) than white (13%) Americans
were uninsured in 2000.5
Many Americans mistakenly believe that the uninsured
obtain adequate care from hospital emergency rooms and
other charity sources. Studies have consistently found,
however, that the uninsured receive significantly less med-
ical care than the insured.7 Nearly 25% of uninsured chil-
dren and 40% of uninsured adults have no regular source
of medical care.6 The uninsured are much more likely to
delay or forgo needed treatment, have their conditions di-
agnosed at a later stage and be admitted to hospital for
avoidable conditions.6 Moreover, inadequate insurance cov-
erage carries with it financial as well as medical risks: the
costs of medical treatment are a leading cause of bank-
ruptcy in the United States.8 Indeed, about half of all bank-
ruptcies in the United States “involve a medical reason or
large medical debt.”9
The number of uninsured individuals actually declined
from 1998 to 1999, from 44.3 to 42.6 million, and in 2000
fell again to 38.7 million (though this latter drop was
mainly due to statistical adjustments in how the govern-
ment counts the uninsured). Yet perhaps most striking is
not the decrease but, rather, that it took so long to happen
and that the overall trend in the past decade remained one
of an expanding uninsured population. Since the early
1990s, the United States has enjoyed ideal conditions for an
expansion of health insurance. The economy has gone
through an unprecedented era of sustained growth, the
rates of general inflation and unemployment have remained
low, and the rate of health care inflation has moderated.
Still, from 1990 to 1998 the number of uninsured people
increased by nearly 10 million (Fig. 1).
That even these favourable circumstances did not gener-
ate any significant expansion of health insurance is disquiet-
ing. And future trends are no more encouraging. The US
economy slowed in 2000, and the unemployment rate rose.
This economic downturn generated new ranks of the unin-
sured: the recent decline in the uninsured rate has ended.
Because most Americans receive health insurance through
their employer, a recession would have a strong negative
impact on access to insurance. For the foreseeable future,
then, the number of uninsured Americans is likely to con-
tinue to grow.
The politics of health reform
National health insurance periodically emerged on the
US political agenda during the 20th century and was often
tantalizingly close to enactment. The most recent failure
came in 1994, with the defeat of the Health Security Act,
sponsored by President Bill Clinton (and drafted under the
guidance of his wife, Hillary). Clinton proposed to achieve
universal coverage in the United States by mandating that
all employers provide private health insurance to their em-
ployees and by giving small businesses and unemployed
Americans subsidies with which to purchase insurance.
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Table 1: Sources of health insurance coverage in
the United States, 2000
Type of coverage Population covered, %*







Note: Source of data is the US Census Bureau.5
*Total is not 100%, because some people have multiple sources of

























































However, the Clinton plan triggered fierce opposition
from the insurance industry (which disliked the proposed
regulation of behaviours, such as experience rating, which
has enabled them to charge higher premiums for sick pa-
tients), the business community (which criticized the em-
ployer mandate), ideologic conservatives (who saw the plan
as an unwarranted nationalization of the health care sys-
tem) and large segments of the public (who were anxious
about the plan’s emphasis on moving patients into HMOs).
Confronted with this opposition and the lack of a liberal
political majority in Congress, the act was defeated. The
American Medical Association, which initially endorsed
and then waffled on the idea of universal insurance cover-
age, did not play a prominent role in the 1993/94 debate, a
sign of its deteriorating influence on US health politics.
One legacy of the Clinton plan’s failure has been caution
regarding health policy. Many politicians took the lesson of
the plan’s demise to be that comprehensive reform —
transforming the US system into one of national health in-
surance, like Canadian medicare — is not politically feasi-
ble. Consequently, talk of attaining universal coverage has
all but disappeared. Neither of the 2 major parties’ presi-
dential candidates in the 2000 election, Al Gore and
George W. Bush, offered plans for universal insurance cov-
erage. None of the plans currently under serious considera-
tion in Congress attempts to cover all of the uninsured.
And even one of the few organized advocates for the unin-
sured, the consumer group Families USA, has toned down
its calls for universal coverage in favour of more modest
policy goals.
What is remarkable about the absence of proposals for
universal coverage in the period 1999–2001 is that the fiscal
circumstances of the United States appeared to be con-
ducive to their adoption. After 2 decades of budget deficits,
the federal government in 2000 ran a sizeable budget sur-
plus, projected at $5.6 trillion over the next decade.10 It has
long been assumed that the lack of affordability of a public
program was a central barrier, particularly in an era of size-
able federal deficits in which large spending initiatives were
politically constrained and tax increases taboo. Now,
though, the affordability argument has been exposed as a
fallacy. Despite the availability of a budget surplus that
could be used to pay the costs of covering the uninsured,
universal coverage did not emerge as a central political is-
sue in 2000/01. Instead, political attention focused on im-
proving the medical experiences of the already insured
through regulation of managed care and expansion of
Medicare to cover outpatient prescription drugs.
It is clear that the most relevant fact about US health
politics is not that some 15% of the population are unin-
sured but that about 85% of the population are insured.
Those who are insured are generally satisfied with their own
medical care, even if they think poorly of the system as a
whole; consequently, they are not a strong constituency for
change. Indeed, any reform that threatens to alter the med-
ical care arrangements of the insured is likely to provoke
public opposition. The formidable constituency against re-
form is mobilized, wealthy and politically influential. Mean-
while, the uninsured are disproportionately low-income,
unorganized and apparently politically expendable. As the
Clinton plan exemplified, the political benefits to a presi-
dent and legislators willing to take on a trillion-dollar health
care industry that opposes reform are uncertain, but the
costs are certain to be high. The result is that universal cov-
erage remains an elusive reform in the United States, and
the uninsured continue to live in an “aura of invisibility.”11
Incremental reforms
Although there is currently little appetite for compre-
hensive reforms that would assure universal coverage, there
is momentum for incremental measures that would reduce
the ranks of the uninsured. Two main pathways to im-
proved coverage have emerged. The first approach is to ex-
pand existing public insurance programs, including Medic-
aid, which provides insurance to about 40% of the poor,
and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), which provides insurance to children living in
families with incomes up to 200% of the federal poverty
line. Proponents of this approach would change eligibility
requirements for these programs, opening them up to
more of the poor and near-poor (e.g., to parents of children
enrolled in SCHIP). One of the more ambitious plans
would extend Medicaid and SCHIP coverage, without pre-
miums or cost-sharing, to all persons with incomes below
150% of the federal poverty line and subsidize enrolment
for persons with incomes up to 300%.12 It is estimated that
this plan would extend eligibility for public insurance to
over 25 million Americans who are currently uninsured.
Most plans, however, would not expand coverage so
broadly and would thus not reach most of the uninsured.
A second approach — one favoured by the Bush admin-
istration — is to adopt tax credits that would help the unin-
sured purchase private insurance. This approach appears to
be especially attractive given the political appeal of tax cuts
and the promise of expanded coverage with minimal gov-
ernment involvement. Most tax-credit proposals would tar-
get individuals, though some plans have instead focused on
credits for employers. Credits could be refundable, so that
even low-income persons who do not pay federal income
tax would be eligible.
There are several problems, however, with tax-credit pro-
posals in particular and incremental reforms more generally.
The main problem with tax credits is the mismatch between
the size of the credits that are being proposed and the cost of
insurance. The average annual premium of a health insur-
ance policy in the United States is now more than US$6000
(Can$8910) for a family and more than $3000 for an individ-
ual. President Bush’s proposal would provide a tax credit of
only $2000 to a family and $1000 to an individual. It is ques-
tionable how much difference these tax credits would make
to the uninsured, many of whom have little disposable in-
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come. This is especially true because insurance for individu-
als has much higher administrative costs than group insur-
ance, and consequently higher premiums.
More fundamentally, neither tax credits nor expanded
public insurance does anything to control medical care
spending. The debate has changed markedly since the early
1990s, when concerns over rapidly rising costs and the eco-
nomic competitiveness of US firms drove health reform.
Politically, the absence of cost containment in the current
proposals is hardly surprising. After all, health care costs
equal the total incomes of the providers of medical care, a
group comprising not merely physicians but also insurers,
hospitals, nursing homes, pharmaceutical companies and all
those selling medical services and products. Any attempt to
restrain national health spending is viewed by providers as
an assault on their livelihood, which triggers intense oppo-
sition. An understandable reading by US politicians of the
Clinton reform debacle is that expanding coverage is diffi-
cult; simultaneously mandating spending controls would be
political suicide.13
Yet there are signs that the moderate medical care infla-
tion that made inattention to cost control comfortable is
ending. Absent cost control, then, incremental reforms may
become self-defeating, with high rates of medical care in-
flation leading to higher-than-expected program costs,
which could make expansion of insurance coverage less af-
fordable and politically problematic.
The rise of managed care
US medical care has long been the most expensive in the
world.14,15 The defeat of comprehensive health reform in
1994 did not obviate the pressures to control health spend-
ing; rather, it shifted the engine of control to the private
sector. Employers looking to hold down their medical bills
embraced managed care and, in a staggeringly short time,
managed care became the norm. By 2000, 92% of persons
with employer-sponsored insurance were enrolled in a
managed care plan.16 Managed care has also spread to pub-
lic programs for the elderly, poor and disabled — Medicare
and Medicaid — though enrolment in such plans is gener-
ally lower than for the employer-sponsored population.17
Managed care has come to refer to a wide range of
health plans and practices that depart from the traditional
US model of insurance. In the traditional model, insured
patients chose their physician; physicians treated patients
with absolute clinical autonomy; insurers generally paid
physicians whatever they billed on a fee-for-service basis;
and employers paid premiums for their workers to private
insurers, footing the bill regardless of its cost. Managed
care has altered all of these arrangements. As a conse-
quence of not having national health insurance, cost con-
trol in the United States has focused more on setting limits
on the individual medical encounter (“managing care”)
than on establishing budgetary limits for the entire health
care sector.
The rise of managed care has brought about 4 major
changes in US medical care. First is the substantial decline in
traditional indemnity-insurance arrangements, which allowed
unfettered access to physicians and unregulated delivery of
medical care. The proportion of Americans with employer-
sponsored indemnity coverage declined from 95% in 1978 to
14% by 1998.18 This drop was accompanied by an increase in
enrolment in a wide variety of managed-care insurance pro-
grams, including HMOs, Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs) and Point of Service plans (POSs). Not only did
HMOs grow in enrolment — from 36.5 million in 1990 to
58.2 million in 1995 — but they also changed substantially in
form. In particular, there has been rapid growth in for-profit
HMOs as well as network and individual-practice association
models that contract with providers; in contrast, group or
staff-model HMOs (such as Kaiser Permanente) own their fa-
cilities, and their physicians work exclusively for them.19 Yet,
while they continue to be regarded as the symbol of managed
care, the growth of HMOs has stalled in recent years, and
more Americans with job-provided insurance are now en-
rolled in PPOs (41%) than in HMOs (29%).16
Second, patients in managed care receive full coverage
for services only if they choose a physician within the plan’s
network. In the case of HMOs, patients receive no coverage
if they see an out-of-network provider. In some plans, pa-
tients must go through a gatekeeper, typically a primary
care physician, to obtain a specialty referral. The corollary is
that most insurers no longer contract with all physicians in a
community. Rather, they contract with a limited number of
doctors, negotiating price discounts in exchange for guaran-
teed patient volume and excluding high-cost providers.
Third, physicians’ clinical decisions are now regularly
subject to external review by insurance plans. Indeed, US
physicians probably experience more intrusion into their
clinical lives than physicians anywhere in the industrialized
world, an ironic development given that the American Med-
ical Association long opposed national health insurance as a
threat to clinical autonomy.20 Under utilization-review
arrangements, physicians may have to seek permission from
the patient’s insurance company for admission to hospital,
diagnostic tests or medical procedures. Utilization review
and physician profiling may also occur after treatment, with
the goal of identifying “inappropriate” or “excessive” care
according to the insurer’s standards. Proponents of man-
aged care argue that these practices can not only control
costs but also enhance quality of care — for instance, by as-
suring adherence to evidence-based medicine.
Fourth, insurers no longer give physicians a blank
cheque; instead, they may dictate not only the price of reim-
bursement but also the form. This has led to the widespread
adoption of predetermined fee schedules for physician pay-
ment by managed care plans, which seek discounts from
“normal” fees. HMOs have also adopted capitated payment,
often focusing on primary care providers. Under capitated
payment, physicians receive a set amount for each patient
enrolled in their practice, regardless of that patient’s actual
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use of services. The stated aim is to avoid the financial in-
centive for overtreatment inherent in fee-for-service pay-
ment. Another important change in payment arrangements
is the introduction of bonuses and other incentives for
physicians to meet targets in providing care. Frequently
these incentives are aimed at ensuring that physicians hold
down costs in a capitated environment; for instance,
bonuses may be provided to physicians whose rate of admis-
sion to hospital for their patient pool is lower than the in-
surer’s target. Along with capitation, these arrangements
put the incomes of many physicians at substantial risk.21
The impact of managed care on costs and
quality
Since the advent of managed care in the early 1990s,
health care spending in the United States has slowed. From
1993 to 1998, the share of gross domestic product (GDP) de-
voted to national health expenditures declined from 13.7% to
13.5%, and premiums for employer-sponsored health insur-
ance actually grew more slowly than the per capita GDP.22
However, the United States continues to spend far more on
medical care than any other nation: in 1998, it spent $4270
per capita, compared with $2400 in Germany, which spent
the second-highest amount, and $2250 in Canada.14,15
There is substantial disagreement among analysts about
the significance of the relative success of the United States in
controlling health care spending during the mid-1990s.
Some observers believe that this experience demonstrates
managed care’s effectiveness in controlling costs and the effi-
ciencies inherent in strategies such as selective contracting,
utilization review and capitation. Others attribute the slow-
down to a one-time switch from indemnity insurance that
cannot be duplicated or to temporary circumstances that
cannot be sustained, such as marketing strategies that led in-
surers to underprice their products to expand market share.
The long-term cost-containment potential of managed care
consequently remains uncertain. However, health care
spending in 1999 and 2000 rose at higher rates: insurance
premiums increased by 8.3% in 2000 (Table 2),23 and even
larger increases were expected for 2001.24 This suggests that
the era of low medical care inflation is over and that man-
aged care’s ability to restrain spending has been exaggerated.
Evidence for the impact of managed care on the quality
of care is mixed. Most studies have found little difference in
quality of care between traditional insurers and managed
care plans, though there is evidence of worse outcomes for
chronically ill seniors in HMOs.25 That quality of care in
many cases did not deteriorate despite reduced volume and
intensity of services suggests that the previous standard of
“unmanaged” care incorporated significant amounts of un-
necessary services. However, these findings also cast doubt
on the premise that managed care is improving quality
through practice guidelines, preventive care, primary care,
disease management, integrated delivery systems and other
strategies. Too often, these strategies exist more as market-
ing labels than as workable or proven innovations, though
that has not stopped them from being aggressively pro-
moted outside the United States, often to receptive audi-
ences looking for new levers to control costs and improve
quality and consumer service. Yet, so far, managed care
plans have not consistently implemented these practices,
and market competition has not resulted in significant
quality improvements. Instead, plans have focused on man-
aging costs, a decision reinforced by employers, who are
much more likely to select insurance on the basis of price
than on the basis of quality.26
The managed-care backlash
Regardless of the evidence, there is strong sentiment
among both physicians and patients that managed care is
harming quality of care. Consequently, there has been a
push to enact patients’ bills of rights and other laws that
regulate the behaviour of managed care plans.27 Virtually all
of the 50 US states now have such laws on the books, and
Congress is debating federal legislation that would permit
patients to sue HMOs, guarantee access to specialists and
establish procedures for appealing health plan decisions
denying coverage or medical care. If adopted, this legisla-
tion will no doubt provide political benefits to its sponsors,
who can assure the voting public that they are doing some-
thing about HMO abuses. Its impact on patients and qual-
ity of care is less certain. The legislation is sufficiently
vague that it is difficult to know how strictly it will be im-
plemented and how much it will change health plan behav-
iour. Moreover, the proposed law does not address issues
such as financial bonuses for physicians and the incentives
of capitation that significantly affect patient care.
US health care system
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Table 2: Changes in annual per capita spending
on medical care and employer-based insurance in









1993 5.0   8.5
1994 2.1   4.8
1995 2.2   2.3
1996 2.0   0.8
1997 3.3   2.1
1998 5.3   3.7
1999 7.1   4.8
2000 7.2   8.3
2001 7.7 11.0
Note: Source of data is the Center for Health System Change, Washington.23
*For 1991/92, 1994 and 1997, the data are based on large firms only; for all
other years the data are for all firms. The 2001 figures are projections.
Conclusion
After a decade of change, the United States appears to
be no closer to solving the problems of cost control and ac-
cess that have characterized its health care system for the
past 3 decades. The question is, after the political system
takes care of the already insured through managed-care
protections and expanded Medicare benefits for the elderly,
what will it do for the uninsured?
The September 11, 2001, bombings of the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon have triggered a new period in
US politics, dominated in the short term by President
Bush’s war on terrorism. In the aftermath of the terrorist
strikes, “United we stand” became a national slogan of soli-
darity. Some health reformers hope that this communitar-
ian spirit and the renewed faith of Americans in govern-
ment will give national health insurance a new life. And
enactment of incremental expansions of public insurance
programs and tax credits for the uninsured is a real possibil-
ity. But it is not clear that health reform will move beyond
these limited steps, which would leave the bulk of the unin-
sured population untouched. Absent a sustained economic
downturn that makes the middle class anxious about their
own coverage, prospects for universal coverage and com-
prehensive health care reform remain dim. The more
things change in US health care policy, the more they seem
to stay the same.
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